BY MAJOR GENERAL BOB DEES:
National security is built on infrastructure long before it is tested on the battlefield. Tanks, aircraft, and troops cannot operate without fuel, electricity, and the industrial capacity behind them. Neither can the American economy. The pipelines, refineries, storage facilities, and export terminals that form the backbone of America’s energy network are therefore more than commercial assets. They are part of the nation’s strategic foundation.

Today, however, that foundation is under growing pressure from lawfare.

For years, environmental organizations and trial attorneys have pursued climate change lawsuits seeking enormous damages from oil and gas companies. The broader campaign is not simply about recovering compensation. Activists supporting it

Now, the legal fallout from the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) protests appears to be opening a related but distinct front. This one could weaken accountability for illegal efforts to disrupt American energy projects and compound the uncertainty surrounding long-term infrastructure investment.

Following the DAPL protests, a North Dakota jury found Greenpeace liable for facilitating a coordinated and unlawful campaign against Energy Transfer – the company behind the pipeline – and the court entered a judgment of approximately $345 million. Yet a countersuit the organization has filed in the Netherlands challenges the American litigation that produced that verdict and seeks relief that could blunt its consequences. What happens now could affect how effectively the U.S. can protect critical energy infrastructure from unlawful interference.

If Greenpeace succeeds in using a foreign court to dilute accountability imposed by the American legal system, other activist organizations may conclude that they can disrupt energy projects without impunity. It would be as simple as seeking relief abroad when impacted parties try to hold them to account. That would embolden the tactics that make infrastructure harder and more expensive to build and undermine energy security.

Developers would face greater construction delays and security costs. Investors and insurers would price in the added risk. Legal uncertainty would leave America with less capacity and resilience when demand rises or a crisis strikes. This would not only affect economic security but embolden our adversaries to use energy as an instrument of coercion.

This should concern Europe as much as the U.S.

Russia offered the clearest recent warning after invading Ukraine, when it weaponized gas supplies and deliberately disrupted flows. The resulting shock sent European energy prices to unprecedented levels and exposed how dependence on an adversary for energy can constrain nations in a crisis. American LNG gave Europe an alternative: the continent received 68% of U.S. LNG exports in 2025 as it continued reducing its dependence on Russian energy. This experience demonstrated that energy security depends on reliable suppliers and the infrastructure needed to deliver their resources.

The broader American energy network that helped protect Europe from Russian coercion also strengthens NATO’s ability to endure a prolonged crisis. During my service as deputy commander of V Corps in Europe, I saw firsthand how reliable energy is a critical component of collective security. Given that a court in the Netherlands, a founding member of the Alliance, would consider a ruling creating a self-inflicted vulnerability on both sides of the Atlantic, it is clear that European nation energy policies and actions need to consistently reinforce the need for collective energy security.

The Dutch court should therefore reject any claim that would contradict matters decided in North Dakota or impose offsetting liability for Energy Transfer’s successful case. European policymakers should ensure that protections for public participation do not become tools for undermining accountability imposed by an allied nation’s courts.

American officials must also treat this as more than a dispute between private parties. The administration should use appropriate diplomatic and legal channels to defend American judgments and make the resilience of U.S. energy infrastructure part of the transatlantic security conversation.

The lesson from Europe is that a nation unable to secure dependable energy becomes vulnerable to those that control it. The vast energy supplies and robust network of energy infrastructure the U.S. possesses allows the country and its allies the freedom to withstand coercion and respond in a crisis. Energy security is national security, and America must preserve the legal certainty required to build and defend the infrastructure on which both depend.

Ret. Major General Bob Dees has more than 30 years of military leadership, including senior command roles in Europe. Dees brings firsthand expertise on the critical links between energy security, infrastructure resilience, and military readiness.

This article originally appeared at Real Clear Energy